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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Using the daily trade of utures from the prediction markets site Intrade, we pin down the 
effect of printed  newspapers  endorsements (announcement of an explicit support for a political 
candidate) on the candidates' likelihood of winning. It is established that unexpected endorsements 
have a large impact on voters' behavior. However, we show that this effect is only true when the 
endorsement is a coherent one: if a newspaper that praises conservative (liberal) po icies endorses a 
candidate  with  liberal  (conservative)  ideas,  the  endorsement  does  not  impact the  candidate's 
probability of winning, as it is egarded as incoherent. Our measure for coherence comes from 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005), but we also use Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004)'s \propensity to 
endorse Democrats" to show that a surprise endorsement has a large and potentially tipping effect in 
a tied contest. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
To what extent printed newspaper endorsements affect the electoral outcomes is still an 
issue of debate in American politics. Although in every electoral cycle most newspapers 
publicly endorse candidates, pinning down their effect is often problematic. The main 
reason is the difficulty in separating the unobserved factors that may be correlated with 
both the endorsement and the probability of winning from the causal effect of endorse- 
ments. The perceived quality of the candidates often changes between elections and even 
within a single election, which makes it crucial to address this concern (see Druckman 
and Parkin (2008)). 
Using the daily trade of futures from the prediction markets site Intrade, we are able 
to focus on the effect of endorsements within elections and, therefore, we can identify 
their effect on the expected probability of winning. Specifically, newspapers’ endorse- 
ments are exogenous to the trading prices: although newspapers’ editorial boards might 
have incentives to endorse the winning candidate, they are unlikely to decide their en- 
dorsements based on the daily price of futures. Moreover, endorsements are decided 
several weeks before their announcement (Meltzer (2007)). If the probability of winning 
and endorsements were jointly determined by candidates’ types, any public information 
on the candidates or the campaign that was used to decide the endorsement would be 
already reflected in the closing price of the previous day, assuming these markets are 
efficient (for which Leigh and Wolfers (2006) show some convincing evidence). Hence, 
endorsements are independent from the prediction market return of the day that the they 
are announced. 
Our empirical strategy allows us to estimate the causal relationship between endorse- 
ments and the probability of winning of a candidate but, beyond treating it as vertical 
differentiation between candidates, it abstains from the mechanism behind that effect; 
that is, independently of whether these endorsements are informative signals of a candi- 
date’s type, or whether they are extra publicity for a candidate, etc.1 
1There are two mechanisms highlighted which are mostly related to the information content of the 
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Traditionally, most newspapers make their endorsements explicitly once per electoral 
cycle in an editorial page where they state their reasons for supporting one candidate or 
the other. This page is clearly separated from the news content of the newspaper and it 
is usually not signed, as it is decided by the editorial board. The direction of this decision 
could be taken either to match the readers’ preferences, or on the contrary, to influence 
them to support the newspapers’ candidate. Thus, it is possible to split the literature into 
demand and supply-driven endorsements. In the latter, the publisher, the owner or the 
journalists (Baron (2006)) in the editorial board decide the endorsements according to 
their own preferences. In the former, endorsements “validate” the readers’ expectations 
by choosing their preferred candidate; this branch in the literature is also referred as 
the “profit-maximizing” view of media outlets (Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005)). Most of 
the time, the editorial endorsement is presented along with some accomplishments of the 
candidate, and the reasons that make him/her the most suitable individual for office.2 
Although it is not mandatory to endorse a candidate, in the 2008 US elections 90 out the 
top 100 newspapers have endorsed a presidential candidate (76 in 2012)(see Table 1). 
Although endorsements usually echo the political stance of the corresponding news- 
papers, and are therefore mostly expected, they may come as (i) a surprise, when a 
newspaper traditionally endorsing one Party goes for the other Party; likewise, they may 
appear to be (2) incoherent, when at odds with the discourse (political language) pre- 
sented in the newspaper. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004)’s measure of “propensity to 
endorse democrat candidates” will be used to define a surprise endorsement, while we 
will resort to Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005)’s “media slant” to classify an endorsement 
as incoherent. The two measures are correlated but not the same. 
We show that Republican endorsements have the largest effect when they come from 
newspapers biased toward the Republican Party while, instead, Democrat endorsements 
have the largest effect when they come from relatively neutral newspapers. Non-credible 
news: the one coming from the finance literature claims that the type and the tone of the news matter 
(Boudoukh et al. (2012)), while the political science argument claims that the endorsements might not 
only be dichotomic but also that could also be informative for some voters. 
2For a detailed account of the wide range of mechanisms to endorse candidates, see Meltzer (2007). 
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or incoherent endorsements, those whose content identifies with one party but endorse 
another one, have no effect. On the contrary, we show that newspapers that deviate 
from their historical endorsements tradition (using Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004)’s 
measure of propensity to endorse democrat candidates) do have an effect on both parties’ 
probabilities of winning. This differentiation between coherent and surprise endorsements 
contributes to further clarify the effect of the informational role of “unexpected” endorse- 
ments, abundant in the literature (Chan and Suen (2008); Chiang and Knight (2011)). 
For instance, we predict a very large effect from the Chicago Tribune endorsement in 
2008: although historically inclined toward the Republican Party (that is, with a low 
propensity to endorse Democrats), the endorsement of Obama in 2008 and 2012 is co- 
herent with respect to the content of the newspaper (its measure of media slant places it 
amongst the Democrat newspapers). 
Some recent papers have looked at this issue from the supply side. For instance, 
Garthwaite and Moore (2012) studies the impact of Oprah Winfrey’s endorsements to 
Obama in 2008, while Chiang and Knight (2011) estimates a model in which voters derive 
information cues from endorsements, after self-sorting into media outlets and filtering 
out ideologically biased information. On the demand-side, de Leon (2010) looks at local 
elections, and shows that the media market structure greatly affects the likelihood of 
endorsing a candidate: in particular, she shows that when the risk of losing readers is 
larger, the newspapers avoid endorsements. Our results are consistent with these papers 
regarding the sign and the magnitude of the effect, however our findings show stronger 
effects for the coherent and surprise endorsements. 
Before moving forward, notice that we use the terms Republican and GOP (a com- 
monly used acronym for the party’s nickname: “Grand Old Party”) interchangeably. In 
the remaining of the paper we discuss our empirical strategy before displaying the main 
results. We then provide a few robustness checks, compare our results to the rest of the 
literature, and finally, conclude. 
4  
2 Estimation Strategy 
 
 
In order to identify and understand the effect of endorsements on the probability of win- 
ning, we derive the baseline model for our estimation from a standard model of voting 
with vertical differentiation (see for instance Groseclose (2001)). From individual behav- 
ior, we derive the expected share of the Democratic Party for each of the 100 days (t) 
before the campaign, Sd,t, and the probability that the Democratic Party wins at time t, 
i.e. Prd,t ≡ Prt(Sdem,t > Sgop,t). Then, we estimate our model using Intrade data as the 
 
probability of winning. 
 
 
 
2.1 The baseline model 
 
There  are  two  Parties,  the  Democratic  and  the  Republican  Party,  indexed  by  p  ∈ 
{dem, gop}. Let xp ∈ R be their political platform (observed by everybody), and xi ∈ R 
 
the voters’ ideological position in the same policy space. The interim utility of the voter 
 
i who would vote for the Democratic Party (p = dem) at time t, can be written as 
 
Ui,dem,t  = −dt(xi, xdem) + q˜dem,t(ηp) + ct, (1) 
and the utility of a voter who votes for the Republican Party p = gop can be written as 
Ui,gop,t  = −dt(xi, xgop) + q˜gop,t(ηp) − ct, (2) 
 
 
where dt(xi, xp) is a distance function between the voter’s ideology xi, unobserved 
 
by the econometrician, and the Party’s platform xp.   Finally, q˜p,t  is a component that 
 
captures the candidates’ quality (or valence3). Hence, the voters’ preferences over a 
candidate are determined by the candidate differentiation, both horizontal (captured by 
the distance function) and vertical. This term captures the beliefs of a voter i over the 
3Valence is a term that comes from the political science literature (Stokes (1963)) and refers to carach- 
teristics that are not only ortoghonal to ideology, but also equally valued by all voters. In economics, 
this would be similar to vertical differentiation. 
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quality of the candidate of Party p at time t. The voters’ expectations over q˜p,t is given 
by 
E(q˜p,t(ηp)|Ip,t) = Ip,t−1 + Endorsp,t + ηp, 
 
where Endorspt is the number of endorsements of party p at time t, ηp is an idiosyn- 
cratic shock over the quality of the candidate that is not observed by the econometrician, 
and It−1 is a measure of the information available at t − 1, which we will approximate by 
Party p’s probability of winning at t − 1: Prp,t−1. 
 
In sum, in the equations 1 and 2 above, there are three terms, which although known 
by the voters, they are unobserved by the econometricians: the voters’ ideology xi, the 
way voters are influenced by candidates’ characteristics ηp (which, for convenience, we 
assume it to be iid with a type 1 extreme value distribution), and the way voters process 
the daily information received in the news, ct. 
Let the voters’ ideological payoff −dt(xi, xp), unknown to the econometrician, be mod- 
eled as a type 1 extreme value random variable: xi,p,t, and let U¯p,t  be the average utility 
derived from voting for party p at time t: 
 
 
U¯p,t = Ip,t−1 + Endorsp,t + ηp + ct. 
 
 
 
Let a voter i vote for candidate p if Ui,p,t > Ui,pl,t, then we can obtain a closed form 
solution for the expected share of the Democratic Party Sdem,t: 
 
Pr(Ui,dem,t > Ui,gop,t) ≡ Sdem,t. 
 
 
 
Thus, the probability that the Democratic Party wins is the probability of its share being 
larger than the Republican share (see Banks and Duggan (2005)): 
 
Pr(D wins, t) ≡ P rd,t ≡ Pr(Sdem,t > Sgop,t) = Pr(U¯dem,t > U¯gop,t), 
 
 
 
which also has a closed form solution (due to the assumption on ηp to be also distributed 
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as a type 1 extreme values random variable). 
 
Therefore, 
 
 
 
 
eU¯dem,t 
P rd,t = eU¯dem,t + eU¯gop,t 
 
We arrive to the baseline model for our main estimations: 
 
 ( 
Prdem,t 
\
 
ln 
Prgop,t 
 
= βdemEndorsdem,t − βgopEndorsgop,t + α(P rdem,t−1 − P rgop,t−1) + 2ct  (3) 
 
 
The above specification is flexible to including not only the number of Democrat 
and Republican endorsements but also some relevant newspaper characteristics such as 
circulation and ideological bias. 4 
 
 
2.2 Data and discussion of the main variables 
 
 
We retrieve information on the endorsements of the top-100-circulation newspapers for 
the US Presidential elections from “The American Presidency Project”. The pricing of 
future contracts during the last 100 days before 2008 and 2012 election day comes from 
the prediction markets website “Intrade”. 
Since all the endorsements in our dataset occurred in the 100 days before the election 
day, we focus on that period of time, for both elections. Besides, the volume of trade 
of future contracts is almost zero until the end of August, when the Demoratic and 
Republican Conventions traditionally take place (see Figure 1). In our dataset, one 
observation is one day, and our main dependent variable is the log of the odds ratio 
Prdem,t / Prgop,t, which captures the perceived relative probability of Obama winning.  A 
future contract has a price Pt ∈ [0, 10] at time t and pays 10 if the event occurs. Thus, 
 
if the price is 5, Obama’s probability of being (re-)elected can be seen as being 1/2, and 
 
4Alternatively, we also estimate a linear version of the equation above that allows us to interpret our 
coefficients directly as growth in the probabilities of winning, but we do not report it here as the results 
are similar in both significance and magnitude. That model is the following: 
Prdem,t − Prdem,t−1  = β 
Prdem,t−1 
 
 
dem 
 
Endors 
 
 
dem,t 
 
− βgop 
 
Endors 
 
 
gop,t 
 
+ t 
 
(4) 
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the corresponding odds ratio as being 1. 
 
 
 
Prediction Markets. We use data from a prediction market Intrade to measure each 
candidate’s probability of winning over the 100 days preceding the election Day. Intrade 
does not directly provide us with the probability of winning of each candidate. Instead, 
it offers winner-take-all contracts linked with the victory of the two candidates. The 
price per share of these contracts lies between 0 and $10, and a transaction is made 
when bid and ask orders meet, at a price that reflects the average probability of each 
candidate’s victory as estimated by market participants (e.g. a price of $5.25 means a 
52.5% probability of winning for Obama). These binary options pay $10 if the chosen 
candidate wins, 0 else. Hence, an investor buying a “Obama to be (re-)elected” future at 
$7 will earn a net payoff of $3, when Obama is elected. 
 
Using daily data allows us to treat each of the campaign days as if it was a different 
election, with different endorsements but keeping the candidates “constant”. The use of 
prediction markets data as winning probabilities is not new in the political economics 
literature: Mattozzi (2008) exploits it to show the existence of stocks’ portfolios that 
could be used as hedging in political markets, and Malhotra and Snowberg (2009) shows 
the effect of the US 2008 primary elections and caucuses on the probability of winning 
of candidates, measured with the price of the futures from Intrade. Moreover, prediction 
markets data has been theoretically motivated in (Mattozzi (2010) , Musto and Yilmaz 
(2003), and partly Manski (2006)) while its empirical validity was ascertained in Forsythe 
et al. (1992); Rothschild (2010); Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004); Saxon (2010); Chen et al. 
(2008), as discussed in the following section. 
Forsythe et al. (1992), in a paper that uses prediction markets data, assure the external 
validity of their results through a survey of the participants to the prediction market. 
Although they have found judgement biases in the trading behavior of the participants 
in the market, the authors show that this bias is driven by the average traders, while the 
“marginal traders” (those who determine the prices in their dataset) do not demonstrate 
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the same behavior. In our case, that would mean that even though there were traders 
buying/selling contracts because they think that endorsements affect the probability of 
winning, if this was not true, the marginal traders would find arbitrage possibilities and 
close the gap produced by those average traders.5 
Figure 2 plots the price of those contracts linked to the victory of Obama over the 100 
 
days preceding the 2008 and 2012 elections. Although Obama won the two elections, his 
victory seems to have been much more predictable in 2008 than in 2012. Both series start 
around 60, but 2008 prices are characterized by a regular increasing trend, while in 2012 
they go up and down, and end at a value of 68.2 (against 91.3 in 2008) on the day before 
Election Day. Few events during the electoral campaign are supposed to impact the 
candidates’ probability of winning like the official Presidential debates (for instance, see 
Holbrook (1996)). During both campaigns, the two candidates agreed to face each other 
three times, while their potential vice-presidents would debate once. Figure 2 shows that 
the price of the contract linked to Obama’s victory varies consistently with the perceived 
performance of the two candidates during these debates: the largest variations in Obama’s 
stock occured in the 2008 and 2012 campaigns on the day following a Presidential debate: 
+9.8 after the second debate in 2008, which Obama “won” according to 54% of those 
surveyed by a CNN poll (only 30% felt McCain had won); -9.6 points after the first 
presidential debate in 2012, which he “lost” unambiguously according to CNN polls (67% 
said Romney had won, against 25% for Obama, and this debate was also the most widely 
viewed Presidential debate in 32 years). As long as these debates are uncorrelated with 
the endorsements, these (possibly omitted) variables should not bias our estimators. That 
is, as the endorsements are likely to be decided at least days before they are published, 
the realization of an event at time t (say, a debate) should not have influenced the 
endorsement decision take at date t − n. Nonetheless, in order to show that our results 
 
are robust, we include dummies for each Presidential and Vice-presidential debate, and 
although some come significant, they do not alter our predictions substantially. 
5This paper also shows there is no serial correlation in the data, as we do in Figure 4 
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In sum, Intrade stock prices, linked to the victory of each candidate, are an accurate 
reflection of their underlying probability of victory. 
 
 
“Unexpected” endorsements. As previously mentioned, a newspaper can en- 
dorse a candidate it was not expected to. We create two variables to deal with these 
unexpected endorsements: one that will be used to capture incoherent endorsements (i.e. 
“unexpected” ideologically), and another one for surprise endorsements (“unexpected” 
according to the newspaper’s history of endorsements). An endorsement is defined as 
incoherent when the ideology of the journal, as measured by Gentzkow and Shapiro 
(2005)’s media slant, and that of the candidate, differ. This media slant measure results 
from comparing the language used by the newspapers to the one used by congressmen 
from each party (looking through the congressional records). A higher value is associated 
with a more Republican content, in terms of the language that is used.6 We then use 
this information, combined with our endorsement data, to classify an endorsement as 
(in)coherent. 
A surprise endorsement, on the other hand, occurs when issued by a journal whose 
tradition was to endorse the other Party. By replicating Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004), 
we obtain a measure of the historical propensity to endorse the Democrat candidate, based 
on data on newspapers endorsements back to 1940.7 An endorsement from a newspaper 
deviating from his historical trend is then considered as a surprise. 
For both our media slant and propensity-to-endorse-Democrats variables, we normal- 
ize the corresponding measure, so that they now lie between 0 and 1. We then divide the 
newspapers into four quartiles of slant and propensity. Table 3 shows the endorsement 
behavior of all newspapers, depending on the slant and propensity quartiles they belong 
to.  The higher their slant, the more likely they are to endorse the Republican candi- 
6This index of media slant follows on the tradition of “content analysis” and has been widely used in 
the literature, for instance in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) from the same authors. 
7In short, the measure is the newspaper’s fixed effect from a regression of endorsements (Democrat, 
Republican, or no endorsement) on the electoral race, period, incumbency and other variables. We 
replicate their analysis in order to obtain the coefficients corresponding to our set of newspapers (they 
only display the FE corresponding to a dozen of newspapers 
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date. More precisely, the first three quartiles are the most aligned with the Democrat 
Party, while the fourth one is Republican. Hence any Republican endorsement coming 
from a newspaper belonging to the first three quartiles will be classified as incoherent. 
The same goes for a Democrat endorsement issued by a newspaper in the 4th quartile 
of slant. Regarding our propensity measure, the endorsement pattern is straightforward: 
across quartiles, the higher the propensity to endorse Democrats, the more Democrat 
endorsements we observe (see also Figure 5). 
Last, if our measures were used to predict a newspaper endorsement, both of them 
would yield similar forecasts. However, although deviations from these “predictions” re- 
sult in “unexpected” endorsements, we have to discriminate between cases (ideological 
vs historical). Our main point is that unexpected endorsements do not necessarily have 
a positive impact on the endorsed candidate: a Republican newspaper in content (ac- 
cording to its media slant) that endorses a Democrat candidate may be interpreted as a 
contradictory endorsement. Yet, it may still be the case that “unexpected” endorsements 
that break from a newspaper historical trend result in a positive surprise to voters, as 
stated in the literature. 
 
 
 
3 Results 
 
 
In this section we present and discuss the estimation of our baseline specification (equation 
(3)) to quantify the effect of the endorsements.  In particular, we do not only explore 
whether the endorsements matter but also which endorsements matter the most. In all 
our specifications, if the coefficient on the Democrat endorsement is positive, it means 
that a day with at least one Democrat endorsement increases the probability of Obama 
winning the election. The impact of endorsements on the Democrat’s probability of 
winning is given by the following equation 
 
 
eβ OR 
Pdem = eβ OR + 1 
,
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where β is the coefficient of interest and OR is the “odds ratio” (Pdem/Pgop). Similarly, 
a negative coefficient accompanying the Republican (or GOP) endorsements implies a 
positive effect on the Republican candidates’ probability of winning (McCain in 2008 and 
Romney in 2012). 
 
 
Do endorsements matter? A first look at Figure 3, which plots the endorsements and 
the odds ratio of Obama winning, does not shed much light on the relationship between 
those two. Hence, beyond the simple bivariate correlations, we proceed to estimating our 
baseline model in equation 3. 
As shown in Table 5, the impact of the endorsements dummy (i.e. takes value 1 for 
days where there was at least one endorsement) is as expected. In the first two columns 
of  the  table  we  show  that,  on  average,  endorsements  to  a  Republican  candidate  have 
a moderate effect on the candidates’ probability of winning: in a tied election a GOP 
endorsement would reduce Obama’s probability from 50% to 47%. More interesting, in 
columns (5) to (7), the Democrat endorsements  only  have  an  effect  when  they  come 
from high circulation newspapers. Moreover, this effect is largest when the newspapers’ 
circulation is above 400 thousand newspapers:  a day with a democrat endorsement from 
a large newspaper increases Obama’s probability from 50% to 58%. In a less contested 
election (suppose he had a 60% of winning) the effect would be smaller (from 60% to 
63%). Also notice that since the Republican endorsements come from lower circulation 
newspapers8, we observe that GOP endorsements only have an effect when they come 
from  those  “smaller”  newspapers. 
If both things were to happen (a GOP endorsement and a high circulation DEM 
endorsement), in a tied election the balance would tip to the Democrat side, increasing 
the probability of winning to 53% approximately. 
8Table 4 shows that approximately 75% of GOP endorsements come from newspapers with circulation 
below 200 thousands. 
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Which endorsements matter the most? As argued above, we measure the newspa- 
pers endorsements’ coherence with Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005)’s praised media slant. 
We normalized their media slant between 0 and 1, and we split the sample in four quar- 
tiles. The first quartile contains the set of newspapers which are the most aligned ones 
with the Democrat party, but as shown in Figure 5 and Table 3, the first three quartiles 
are largely dominated by democrat-leaning newspapers. That is, this measure is consis- 
tent with the documented media bias toward the Democrat party (de Leon (2010) and 
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004)). 
The main result coming from Tables 6 to 8 is that incoherent endorsements have no 
effect while the coherent endorsements and surprise endorsements have a large, positive, 
significant and robust effect. Besides, except for the mentioned asymmetric effect of circu- 
lation, the magnitude of the Democrat and Republican endorsements on the probability 
of winning is very similar. 
In Tables 6 we use a coarse classification of the newspapers according to their endorse- 
ments’ coherence: a coherent Democrat endorsement comes from the first three quartiles 
of the media slant, while a Republican coherent endorsement comes from newspapers in 
the fourth quartile. In order to show that our conclusions do not depend on the split- 
ting of the sample, we also show the results by quartile in Table 7. Noticeably, only 
the coherent endorsements increase the probability of winning of the endorsed candidate, 
and this is more particularly the case for Republican endorsements (large and significant 
impact): the presence of one such coherent Republican endorsement decreases Obama’s 
probability of winning from 50% to 41% approximately. In a less tied election scenario, 
the same effect could reduce the Democrat’s probability from 60% to 47%. Moreover, the 
incoherent endorsements are never significant, neither using a dummy nor the number of 
endorsements in a day (what we refer to as the Count variable). 
The specification of Table 7 shows that the Democrat endorsements from relatively 
neutral newspapers (in the third quartile of media slant, i.e. the most conservatives 
of the Democrat newspapers) have a positive impact on Obama’s winning odds.  On 
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the contrary, coherent Republican endorsements diminish them. In sum, in a day with a 
coherent Republican endorsement and a neutral Democrat endorsement, the overall effect 
is null due to similar magnitude of the coefficients (their sum is not significantly different 
to zero). 
The evidence shown above complements the documented effect of surprise endorse- 
ments. Remember that due to the construction of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005)’s media 
slant , an incoherent endorsement comes from a newspaper that esteems one type of 
policy, but does not support the candidate that proposes those policies. Indeed, such an 
endorsement is an unexpected one, but nonetheless it may be more confusing than infor- 
mative for their readers. Applying this reasoning, while the Republicans only value the 
coherent endorsements, the Democrats see a larger effect when they come from relatively 
more neutral newspapers (not necessarily expected, but relatively consistent). 
Moreover, although the media slant is correlated with Ansolabehere and Snyder 
(2004)’s propensity to endorse the Democrat candidate, the results  from  the  previous 
tables are reversed when we show the effect of surprise endorsements, as expected. This 
is shown in Table 8, where the newspapers with a high propensity to endorse democrats 
(quartiles 3 and 4) have a large effect when they endorse the republican candidate (that 
is, when they are surprising), and the other way around.9 
 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
 
We add to the increasing literature on media and politics by pinning down the effect of 
printed newspapers endorsements on the candidates’ likelihood of winning. Using survey 
data, Chiang and Knight (2011) show that endorsements make readers more likely to 
vote for the endorsed candidate, and that this effect is even larger when endorsements 
are unexpected. Our results are consistent with the latter findings, but we go further by 
establishing that all unexpected endorsements do not have the same effect. In particular, 
9Notice that we cannot interact both measures of newspapers’ bias due to lack of data: only for 53 
newspapers we have both measures. 
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using Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004)’s measures 
of the ideological leaning of newspapers, we show that although they are unexpected, 
incoherent endorsements have no effect. On the contrary, endorsements that are coherent 
with respect to the discourse used in the newspaper, and endorsements coming as a 
surprise with comparison to the newspaper’s endorsement tradition, have a large and 
potentially tipping effect in a tied contest. 
If, as argued elsewhere, endorsements are informative about the candidates’ attributes, 
their presence might be welfare improving as they make the “better” candidate more likely 
to win. Nonetheless, knowing their effect on the probability of winning, a campaign man- 
ager may try to persuade newspapers to endorse his candidate. Would that strategy 
defeat the potential welfare-improving presence of endorsements? According to our re- 
sults, in aggregate, the society is not influenced by incoherent endorsements. Hence, such 
a luring attempt would have an impact only if the endorsement is coherent, for which the 
campaign manager should not put any effort. 
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5 Appendix 
 
 
5.1 The underlying voting model 
 
 
In summary, the uncertainty has a horizontal component, and a vertical component.  If 
we assume that d is separable, we can write Uipt as 
 
 
 
 
Ui,p,t = −d(x˜i, xp) + qp,t(η˜p) ± c˜t 
= h(xp) + βpEndorspt + f (Inf op,t−1) + η˜p + x˜i ± c˜t 
≡ up,t(η˜p, c˜t) + x˜i 
≡ Vp,t(c˜t) + η˜p,t ± cit 
 
 
Hence, a voter i votes for candidate p if Uipt > Uiplt. And so Pr(Ui,dem,t > Ui,gop,t) ≡ 
Sdem,t is the expected share for the democratic party Sdem,t, which can be written as 
(Nevo (2000)): 
 
 
 
eudem,t Sdem,t = eudem,t + eugop,t 
 
Thus,  the  probability  that  the  democratic  party  wins  is  the  probability  that  the 
democratic share is larger than the republican share (see Banks and Duggan (2005)): 
 
Pr(D wins, t) ≡ Pr(Sdem,t > Sgop,t) = Pr(udem,t > ugop,t) 
 
 
Which is the same as 
 
 
 
Pr(ln(Sdem,t) > ln(Sgop,t)) 
 
 
So 
 
Pr(D wins, t) = 
 
 
eVdem,t 
eVdem,t + eVgop,t 
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Thus, 
 
 ( 
Prdem,t 
\
 
ln 
Prgop,t 
 
= βdemEndorsdem,t − βgopEndorsgop,t + f (Inf odem,t−1) − f (Inf ogop,t−1) + 2ct 
19  
5.2 Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Volume of trade (weights) over the months prior to Election Day in 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Daily Obama’s stock prices at 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections. 
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Figure 3: Number of endorsements and Obama’s winning odds ratio at 2008 and 2012 
Presidential elections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Residuals of the WLS regression plotted against time: regression of Obama’s 
winning odds-ratio on dummies for DEM and GOP endorsements, with month and week- 
end FE, and weighted by volume (corresponding to Table 5, Column (2). 
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Figure 5: This graph shows the Republican and Democrat endorsements according to 
our normalized measures of media slant (left panel, with 1 being the most Republican) 
and propensity to endorse Democrats (right panel, with 1 being the most Democrat). 
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6 Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1: Top 100 newspaper endorsement statistics, by Presidential candidate during the 
US 2008 and 2012 election cycles   
2008 2012 
 Obama McCain Obama Romney 
Circulation endorsement (millions) 16.099 5.194 10.015 6.476 
Days with an endorsement 18 11 17 16 
Total endorsements 25 65 41 35 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Number of endorsements and days of endorsements,  per circulation,  for each 
party   
dem endorsements gop endorsements Total 
 
Circulation 
(in thousands) 
>-100 
# newspapers 
 
97 
# days 
 
33 
# newspapers 
 
51 
# days 
 
27 
# newspapers 
 
148 
# days 
 
40 
>-200 50 22 16 13 66 25 
>-400 12 8 5 5 17 12 
>-600 6 6 1 1 7 7 
>-800 2 2 0 0 2 2 
Total 106 35 60 27 166 40 
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Table 3:  Number of endorsements and days of endorsements, per slant and propensity 
quartiles,  for  each  party   
dem endorsements gop endorsements Total 
 
slant quartiles # newspapers # days # newspapers # days # newspapers # days 
Q1 29 16 10 9 39 21 
Q2 28 17 10 9 38 23 
Q3 29 15 9 9 38 16 
Q4 13 11 24 14 37 19 
Total 99 35 53 27 152 40 
propensity quartiles # newspapers # days # newspapers # days # newspapers # days 
Q1 5 5 20 14 25 17 
Q2 14 11 10 5 24 13 
Q3 22 16 3 3 25 17 
Q4 23 15 0 0 23 15 
Total 64 35 33 27 97 40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics of newspapers’ circulation (in millions) 
 
Newspapers Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
 
DEM endorsements 
 
0.246 
  
0.208 
 
0.078 
 
1.587 
 
106 
GOP endorsements 0.194  0.129 0.083 0.702 60 
 
1st quartile slant 
 
0.242 
  
0.141 
 
0.094 
 
0.703 
 
39 
2nd quartile slant 0.325  0.31 0.083 1.587 38 
3rd quartile slant 0.187  0.076 0.088 0.401 38 
4th quartile slant 0.173  0.097 0.078 0.494 37 
 
All 
 
0.228 
  
0.185 
 
0.078 
 
1.587 
 
166 
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Dummy DEM 
Dummy GOP 
Circulation > 200 thousand DEM 
Circulation > 200 thousand GOP 
Circulation > 400 thousand DEM 
Circulation > 400 thousand GOP 
 
Month FE 
Weekend FE 
Debate FE 
 
r2 
N 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.010 0.024 -0.061 -0.054 -0.003 0.010 0.011 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
-0.118∗ -0.109 -0.095 -0.096 -0.191∗∗ -0.184∗∗ -0.186∗ 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
0.200∗∗ 
(0.10) 
(0.09) 
0.218∗∗ 
(0.10) 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
  -0.098 -0.064    
  (0.14) (0.13)  
0.342∗∗ 
 
0.339∗∗∗ 
 
0.337∗∗ 
    (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
    0.043 0.046 0.048 
    (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
No No No No No No Yes 
0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Standard errors in parentheses        
All specifications are weighted regressions        
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Endorsements baseline effects (dummy). 
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Dummy 
Table 6: Coherence (slant). Dummies and Count. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coherent DEM endorsement (Q1-Q3) 0.065 0.070 0.085 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Incoherent DEM endorsement (Q4) -0.051 -0.052 -0.066 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Coherent GOP endorsement (Q4) -0.336∗∗ -0.344∗ -0.354∗∗ 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) 
Incoherent GOP endorsement (Q1-Q3) 0.091 0.091 0.101 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Count 
Coherent DEM endorsement (Q1-Q3)    0.024 0.025 0.017 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Incoherent DEM endorsement (Q4)    -0.010 -0.014 -0.035 
 
Coherent GOP endorsement (Q4) 
   (0.09) 
-0.174∗ 
(0.09) 
(0.09) 
-0.167∗ 
(0.10) 
(0.08) 
-0.169∗ 
(0.09) 
Incoherent GOP endorsement (Q1-Q3)    0.065 0.068 0.089 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Weekend FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Debate FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes 
r2 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.77 0.78 0.80 
N 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Standard errors in parentheses       
All specifications are weighted regressions       
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01       
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Dummy 
Table 7: Quartiles of coherence (slant). Dummy and count variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
High coherence DEM (Q1) -0.097 -0.099 -0.095 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Medium coherence DEM (Q2) 0.042 0.041 -0.055 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) 
Low coherence DEM (Q3) 0.188∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Incoherent DEM (Q4) -0.101 -0.103 -0.144 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
High incoherence GOP (Q1) 0.129 0.127 0.229∗ 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) 
Medium incoherence GOP (Q2) 0.102 0.108 0.094 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Low incoherence GOP (Q3) 0.019 0.014 0.070 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) 
Coherent GOP (Q4) -0.296∗∗ -0.296∗ -0.289∗ 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) 
Count 
High coherence DEM (Q1)    -0.073 -0.074 -0.082 
 
Medium coherence DEM (Q2) 
   (0.07) 
0.165∗∗∗ 
(0.06) 
(0.07) 
0.163∗∗ 
(0.07) 
(0.07) 
0.112∗ 
(0.06) 
Low coherence DEM (Q3)    0.078∗ 0.081∗ 0.074 
    (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Incoherent DEM (Q4)    0.047 0.042 -0.008 
    (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
High incoherence GOP (Q1)    0.053 0.052 0.126 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Medium incoherence GOP (Q2)    0.071 0.077 0.057 
    (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Low incoherence GOP(Q3)    -0.122 -0.117 -0.033 
 
Coherent GOP (Q4) 
   (0.10) 
-0.218∗∗ 
(0.10) 
(0.10) 
-0.214∗∗ 
(0.11) 
(0.13) 
-0.194∗∗ 
(0.09) 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Weekend FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Debate FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes 
r2 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.79 0.81 
N 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Standard errors in parentheses       
All specifications are weighted regressions       
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01       
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Table 8: Surprise (propensity). Dummy variables. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Very surprising DEM (Q1) 0.207 0.167 0.153 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.16) 
Surprising DEM (Q2) 0.191 0.212 0.238 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.16) 
Anticipated DEM (Q3) -0.182 -0.174 -0.160 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) 
Very Anticipated DEM (Q4) -0.035 -0.009 -0.037 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
Very Anticipated GOP (Q4) 0.110 0.110 0.109 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Anticipated GOP (Q3) -0.175 -0.135 -0.184 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.18) 
Surprising GOP (Q2) -0.223∗∗ -0.217∗ -0.212∗ 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) 
Anticipated DEM (Q3-Q4) -0.184 -0.172 -0.175 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) 
Surprise DEM (Q1-Q2) 0.233∗ 0.257∗ 0.259∗ 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
Anticipated GOP (Q1-Q2) 0.041 0.062 0.051 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Surprise GOP (Q3-Q4) -0.213 -0.211 -0.193 
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16) 
 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Weekend FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Debate FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes 
 
r2 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.77 0.77 0.79 
N 200 200 200 200 200  200 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
All specifications are weighted regressions 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
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